Forward to part 4, Effects of Ethnic Appeals"Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia"
V.P. Gagnon, Jr.
2. The concept of ethnic solidarity
Another implication of much of the ethnic conflict literature
is that ethnicity is a natural cleavage in politics, and thus
ethnic solidarity, that is, identification with the ethnic group
as a natural political phenomenon, can easily be made to take
priority over all non-ethnic issues, including economics, class,
etc.[16] From this perspective
we would expect that political rhetoric and influence attempts
would be consistently framed in terms of ethnicity, appealing
to ethnic solidarity in either a positive or negative way. But
even at a conceptual level, the shortcomings of this assumption
are seen even if we ignore direct economic interest, and consider
“culture” as a key element of political discourse.
If culture is defined as practice (or even in a more narrow or “primordial” way as that practice to which one is exposed as a child, and which is thereby adopted as one’s “own”) then it clearly includes many things besides specifically ethnic aspects of being. Socio-economic status may be just as important as ethnicity in defining someone's cultural practices and relations with others, and may at times be more important, especially where language differences are not a major factor in defining ethnic differences. Which parts of culture are relevant to a particular context depends entirely on that context, and even then other parts do not lose all relevance, since different aspects of culture are not mutually exclusive, and indeed coexist simultaneously. Neither "ethnic" or "socio-economic" aspects of culture are more or less real or authentic or “primordial.” Both may be inculcated within the family from an early age; both may be either nurtured and defended as identity, or changed according to context, education, etc. Viewing culture only in ethnically-defined terms is therefore just as misleading as viewing it as only class-defined. If political rhetoric is based on cultural affinities, it must be recognized that such affinities are not necessarily limited to membership in the same "ethnic group."
If we accept this wider definition of culture, then it becomes very clear that even beyond divergent economic interests there existed very significant cultural variations--regional, social, linguistic, socio-economic--among Serbs in Yugoslavia (and among Croats and among Muslims). Serbs who lived in large cities in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia itself were very different in overall cultural terms than Serbs in rural regions of Kosovo, Bosnia, and Krajina. These cultural differences were apparently as deep as or deeper than the differences between nominal members of different ethnic groups. Thus in overall cultural terms, taking into account factors in addition to narrowly "ethnic" ones, a Serb lawyer in Belgrade could be closer culturally to a Croat doctor in Zagreb than to a Serbian peasant in rural, underdeveloped mountains of Bosnia or Kosovo.[17] In the case of a Serb and a Croat doctor or lawyer in ethnically mixed areas of Yugoslavia, such as Slavonia, Vojvodina, or much of Bosnia, this was even more so the case.
Given this structure of cultural cleavages, any attempt by political actors to mobilize solely along explicitly "ethnic" lines of Serb vs. non-Serb would meet the resistance of a large number of Serbs, especially in urban areas, who were the bearers of the most liberal and enlightened version of Yugoslavism, and who in political terms were most open to pluralism and coexistence. This is again not to say that these people had no sense of being Serbs, or did not value cultural heritage defined in national terms. Rather, it is to point out that appealing to them on narrowly ethnic terms alone would not necessarily be an automatic success if it ignored other facets of identity and interest, both economic and cultural. And indeed, as the following examples show, non-ethnic issues have been central to political discourse at exactly those times when the active support of the majority of the wider population has been needed (at times of election campaigns), and at times of popular anti-regime mobilizations.
Prior to 1990 and the start of active political mobilization against the ruling communist party by challenger political elites, the focus in political rhetoric was on ethnic issues, especially in terms of grievances against Tito’s Yugoslavia, which was portrayed as repressive against Serbs, and grievances against “nationalist” and “separatist” Albanians in Kosovo who were said to be terrorizing Serbs in the province. But in this period the regime had no need to actively mobilize the population for support; politics was still limited to processes and actors within the communist party. The apparent mobilizations of this period will be discussed below. But what is also important to note at this point is that, as mentioned above, there was no violent conflict along ethnic lines in this period, especially nothing comparable to what would occur in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.
1990 marked a striking shift in the political environment. Although the ruling party resisted to the bitter end, by the fall of 1990 events in the rest of Eastern Europe and in the other Yugoslav republics, as well as mass pressure from within Serbia itself, forced the ruling party to accept the holding of multiparty elections. What is of interest here is the rhetorical arguments and issues used by the party in its attempt to gain the support of a majority of Serb voters in Serbia.[18] In the first multiparty elections in Serbia, in December 1990, Milosevic focused on social justice and peace, in particular citing the dangers of unemployment, economic insecurity and colonization of Serbia by the European Community as a way of appealing for people's support. He blamed the existing economic problems on the reformist policies of federal prime minister Ante Markovic. And indeed, among those who voted for the SPS 66 percent gave priority to developing a strong economy (among those who voted for the main nationalist opposition party, the Serbian Renewal Movement or SPO, the figure was 58 percent) and 59 percent to improving the material conditions of life (SPO, 54 percent).[19]
On ethnic issues, he sought to underbid the nationalist opposition. Milosevic denounced the SPO as primitives who were stirring up ethnic conflicts and who wanted to drag Serbia into war, who threatened to undermine efforts at economic reform, and who "provoke confrontation, incite hatred toward other peoples and nations."[20] His victory, Milosevic argued, would ensure peace at home and with the other republics. And while 66 percent of SPS voters listed themselves as "having a strong national orientation," 49 percent also listed good interethnic relations as a priority issue (these figures for SPO voters were 92 percent and 24 percent).[21]
The March 1991 anti-regime street rallies in Belgrade, although not fully analogous to election periods, nevertheless provides further evidence along these lines, since the focus of this anti-regime mobilization was purely non-ethnic. Hundreds of thousands of protesters filled the streets demanding an end to the regime monopoly over the media, the introduction of real economic reforms, and an end to the provocation of conflict with other Yugoslav republics. This period also saw massive anti-regime strikes in important industrial sectors, as well as a split in the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) along reform-antireform lines. Milosevic's response, after the Army refused to crush the protest with massive force, was to give in on these issues, establishing a roundtable Serbian National Council, allowing the adoption of some economic reform, and printing money to pay disgruntled workers. In addition, following the protests Milosevic became much more conciliatory in the inter-republic talks on the future of Yugoslavia, finally agreeing to consider a confederal solution and accepting the basic principles of such a solution, after months of refusing to budge from his demand for a more centralized federation.[22] Although he also portrayed the protests as part of an anti-Serbian coalition that was trying to destroy Yugoslavia, and as agents of Albanian, Croatian, and Slovene enemies of Serbia (a rhetoric lacking from his pre-election speeches), the SPS was forced to undertake a policy of compromise and conciliation toward the other Yugoslav republics for three months, and was able to overcome this focus on nonethnic issues only by engineering and provoking the outbreak of violent conflict in Croatia, which was then pointed to as an injustice that demanded unity of Serbia.
The next elections, at the federal level, were held in May 1992. The full-scale war in Croatia had proved very unpopular in Serbia, prompting thousands of young men to flee the country to avoid being drafted, while whole units of draftees within the army itself deserted from the front. By spring 1992 a very strong anti-war student movement had arisen, and petitions calling for Milosevic's resignation gained upwards of one million signatures.[23] Not coincidentally, at this moment the SPS and its allies in Bosnia started perpetrating violence along ethnic lines in Bosnia-Hercegovina, accompanied by even more vociferous accusations of injustices against innocent Serbian women and children in that republic.
But in the May 1992 elections (though they were boycotted by the democratic opposition), the SPS again portrayed itself as wanting peace. It arranged for the formation of a new federal Yugoslavia, thus formally recognizing the other Yugoslav republics' independence, and announced that it had pulled the Yugoslav army out of Bosnia, and that only Bosnian Serb soldiers remained.[24] As mentioned above, the conflict itself was described in terms of innocent Serbs defending themselves. Indeed, not until after the polls closed on election day were Serbian television viewers informed that the forces shelling Sarajevo were Serbian.[25]
Perhaps the clearest example of ethnic underbidding (that is, trying to appear more conciliatory on issues of interethnic relations than political competitors) came in the December 1992 presidential elections, where Milosevic was challenged by Serbian-born American businessman Milan Panic. Panic ran on a platform that explicitly stressed economic issues, called for immediate economic liberalization and privatization and in particular stressed the absolute necessity of ending the UN economic sanctions. Milosevic's response was to emphasize that the sanctions had positive effects (for example, allowing infant industries to develop) and that Serbia had its own resources and the ability to withstand sanctions.[26] He stressed the importance of economic development as a key goal, and again printed billions of dinars to pay workers who had not received a paycheck in months. The SPS accused Panic of being a foreign agent, and stressed that Serbia would never bow to foreigners who try to tell her voters how to behave.[27]
On "ethnic issues" Panic called for an immediate end to the war in Bosnia and recognition of republic borders, improving relations with the west, and (in an uncanny repetition of Milosevic's own rhetoric from the December 1990 campaign) called on Serbs to look toward the future rather than the past. He noted that Serbia had to be concerned with the fate of Serbs outside Serbia, but pointed out that their negative situation was due exactly to the past policies of the SPS. In response to SPS claims that Kosovo was being subverted from abroad, Panic pointed out that no one recognized Kosovo as independent of Serbia.
Rather than trying to ethnically outbid Panic, Milosevic instead stressed ethnic tolerance, the equality of all citizens of Serbia, and even stated, while in Kosovo, that most Albanians are blameless, and only a small minority of separatists, aided by Tirana, were the cause of problems. Indeed, he even implied that the Kosovo problem was basically resolved since the Serb population there was increasing and thus the ethnic balance was more "natural."[28] Milosevic also stressed that Serbia had no territorial claims against any other state, vehemently denied charges of ethnic cleansing by Serbs as impossible, and pointed out that Serbia was extending hospitality to refugees of all nationalities.
Thus in his political rhetoric Milosevic consistently recognized the continuing primacy of nonethnic issues. His stress on social justice, economic development and ethnic peace all belie hypotheses that would expect a political rhetoric of ethnic outbidding. In fact, the rhetoric of ethnic injustice came to the fore especially in periods after elections, or when the opposition was mobilizing people against the regime. It was exactly in these periods that Serbian forces would begin to provoke conflict along ethnic lines, which was then pointed to as evidence of injustices. The very fact that the provocation of such incidents was necessary to divert attention from economic and peace issues in itself is evidence that ethnic issues, though not unimportant, are not so central as to exclude people's other nonethnic interests.
Forward to part 4, Effects of Ethnic Appeals
Back to part 2, Structure of Political Appeals,
ethnicity and injustices
This page last revised 10/20/99