Pennsylvania 62nd Infantry Regiment

Overland Campaign

Organization

The 62d Pennsylvania's place in the organization of Army of the Potomac at the time of the battle in the Wilderness, 5 to 8 May 1864:

• United States Army (Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, commander)
  • Army of the Potomac (Major-General George Meade)
    • Fifth Army Corps (Major-General Gouverneur K. Warren)
      • First Division (Brigadier General Charles Griffin)
        • Second Brigade (Colonel Jacob Bowman Sweitzer)
          • 9th Massachusetts (Colonel Patrick R. Guiney)
          • 22d Massachusetts (Colonel William S. Tilton)
          • 32d Massachusetts (Colonel George L. Prescott)
          • 4th Michigan (Lieutenant-Colonel George W. Lumbard)
          • 62d Pennsylvania (Lieutenant-Colonel James C. Hull)

Regimental History

The Overland Campaign begins.

With U. S. Grant taking over command of all the army, the nature of the war changed. Instead of intermittent staged battles followed by one side's retreat and both side's recuperation, Grant waged a brutal, continuous campaign. In what would be a series of indecisive battles in which the Union army never retreated, but pressed forward, the Campaign began on the 1st of May. Part of Grant's strategy must of come from his awareness that a large percentage of his army were in three year regiments whose expiration of service was only a few months away. While he had superior numbers, he appeared to be willing to brutally sacrifice soldiers to wear down and expend the smaller numbers of Confederate troops.

 

On the 1st of May, the 62d Pennsylvania was in Winter Camp on the north side of the Rappahannock River at Rappahannock Station. It broke camp, and, with the rest of the the Fifth Corps, crossed the Rappahannock and marched to a bivouac near Brandy Station. The next day a torrential rain interrupted further marching. On 3 May, they moved on to the vicinity of Culpepper Court House. Around midnight, an all night march was begun, and toward daybreak Germanna Mills was reached. Earlier Union cavalry had cleared away a small Confederate post at Germanna Ford, and a pontoon bridge had been laid across the Rapidan River. As part of the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Fifth Army, the 62d Pennsylvania crossed the Rapidan in the early morning. The Fifth Corps was huge, complete with wagon trains and a herd of cattle. River crossings were often occasions, but the Union army encountered no opposition. The Fifth Corps then marched down the Orange Turnpike until around 2 p. m., halting at a crossroads near the Wilderness Tavern. It could have marched further, but there was concern about leaving the right too open and keeping the trains secure. As part of the Fifth Corps, soldiers of the 62d spent the night laying across the pike, about a mile out from Germanna Road.

 

Grant did not expect to do battle in the Wilderness; its unfitness as a field of battle had been learned during the Battle of Chancellorsville. When the army crossed the river without opposition it was hoped that the Confederate forces had retreated to more open ground. However, Lee outguessed Grant, and undiscovered, was ready to bring the battle to him where superior forces would be no advantage and where neither artillery nor cavalry could be effectively used. Near a crossroads where stood the Wilderness Tavern, the Fifth Corps bivouaked, unaware of the battle that would begin the next morning. By late in the day on the 4th Grant still only had a sketchy idea of the location of the body of Confederate troops, and where the Union Army rested after mid-day, the Confederate continued to move well into the night and again in the early morning.

Battle in The Wilderness, on 5 to 7 May 1864

The Wilderness was the first battle fought after U.S. Grant was elevated to command all the armies of the United States. His dual goals were to continue to press on toward Richmond and to destroy the Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The Army of the Potomac technically was still commanded by George Meade, and there is still debate whether even in the first days of the Battle of Wilderness Meade took any initiative without first consulting Grant.

 

The Wilderness is a difficult country with a few narrow roads cutting through thickets of second growth pine, scrub, briary underbrush. One author called it "tangled labrynths of confusion and destruction." Throughout the battle in the Wilderness regiments were unable to maintain communication with commanders, other regiments in their brigade, or even others in their own regiments. Confusion caused numerous deaths and injuries by friendly fire, including the wounding of General Longstreet. There were even reports that some would-be-deserters ended up running toward the front instead of the rear of the battle. To further complicate the situation and create more danger, wildfires broke out during the battle and spread rapidly.

THE FIRST DAY (MAY 5), THE GIST: The word came out before 7 a. m. that a Confederate force was already advancing from Orange Court House. Camp was broken, and the Fifth Corps, with Griffin's division in the rear, marched south down the Brock Road then west down the Orange Plank Road toward Parker's Store. By 7:30 General Meade recieved a dispatch the enemy force was on the pike, so orders were changed, and the Corps turned back north to meet the enemy force close to the position of the 62d at the start of the day. The corps then formed a position across the Turnpike about a half mile west of the Wilderness Tavern. Griffin's division was now at the head of the corps and spent the rest of the morning throwing up a hasty breastworks of logs and any other material at hand to establish a line about 300 yards what proved to be Rodes' and Early's divisions of Ewell's Corps. The Fifth and Sixth Corps were supposed to attack in conjunction, but by the time the battle began, the Sixth Corps not yet arrived. The Second Corps was still near Chancellorsville, and the Ninth Corps had yet to cross the river. Nonetheless, sometime mid-morning the Fifth Corps was ordered to advance forward from its position behind the breastworks to meet the enemy. Grant believed the main Confederate force was still much further south and that it was not necessary to wait for the full strength of the army to for the Fifth Corps to contain a rear-guard force. Shortly after noon, skirmishing turned into a real battle when Griffin's Division of the Fifth Army encountered Ewell's Corps. Only then was the full strength of the Confederate force discovered. It was facing the whole of Ewell's corps, not just a division. The Fifth Corps initially took command of the field. Griffin's Division routed John M. Jones's brigade of Johnson's division, and then advanced against Rodes's division south of the Turnpike. In this advance, however, the right flank, still unsupported by the Sixth Corps, was outflanked. By one-thirty the First Brigade was driven back and the rest of Griffin's Division had to retreat to its breastworks. Reports were that "Griffin had been pushed back somewhat." By midafternoon the Sixth Corps finally arrived and helped repulse the attack and hold the line. To the south the Fourth Division of the Fifth Corps became confused and lost before reaching the left flank of Griffin's Division. It was attacked and driven back in disorder. The Fifth Corps was thus split and the Confederate army advanced through the gap before digging in. Meanwhile, the rest of A.P. Hill’s corps encountered the rest of the Union army, principally the Second Corps, on the Plank Road. Only after dark, shortly after 8 P. M., did the desperate fighting stop. Through the afternoon, fighting was fierce but inconclusive as neither side was able to maneuver in the dense thickets and difficult underbrush. A Union force of approximately 38,000 had met a Confederate force of 14,000, and neither could claim the upper hand.

THE SECOND DAY (MAY 6), THE GIST: The fighting recommenced at dawn on May 6. The Second Corps initially drove back Hill’s Corps until Longstreet’s Corps arrived to prevent a rout. By noon, the Confederates mounted a fierce attack until Longstreet was wounded by friendly fire. The Ninth Corps finally arrived in late afternoon, taking a position in the center of the line. It advanced, but was repulsed. To the north where the Fifth and Sixth Corps faced Ewell's Corps, which during the night had been strongly reinforced, there was repeated action the second day, but neither side was able to penetrate the other's line. Since both armies were well entrenched, and the distance in between was such a tangled forest, almost any attack would have promised failure. Throughout the day, wildfires raged and become as much an enemy as any human force, especially perilous to the wounded and fallen. Once again, when the fighting ended at nightfall, neither army had taken command.

THE THIRD DAY (MAY 7), THE GIST: Most of both armies took up defensive positions and reorganized their commands. There was only detached fighting on similar lines of the previous days' encounters. Well after nightfall, the Union Army began to move. The fight had been a tactical draw, but a large Union force had failed to destroy or even dislodge a smaller Confederate force. Private soldiers feared that the war effort under a new general would not make a different. The tactic of continued hammering against an impenetrable wall of the enemy line at severe cost of life had not worked before and did not appear to be working any better. But what General Grant did that was different was that he did not acknowledge this as a defeat. Grant gave up the fight, but in his own way. Instead of retreating and withdrawing north of the river, he ordered the army forward toward Spotsylvania Court House in an attempt to place the Army of the Potomac between Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia. By the following night, the Fifth Corps moved to the left in the first of a series of flanking maneuvers toward Spottsylvania Court House.

DETAILS ABOUT THE 62D: I am not sure of the position of the 62d Pennsylvania on the first day, when it saw the most action. One report suggests that it was placed somewhere in the middle of the Second Brigade, which itself was at the extreme right of the First Division with held the extreme right of the battle line. As the division took position in a line of battle facing west at midday, just before the battle began, the 62d Pennsylvania held the extreme right against the Orange Turnpike, with other members of the brigade on the left. After the Second Brigade began to advance, the 62d probably left the road. After it encountered the first of Ewell's forces in the confusing jungle of thicket and underbrush, perhaps even its own soldiers weren't sure of their position. As 3 o'clock approached, the regiment must have been ordered to retreat as the division was outflanked. There were reports that the brigade retired in good order to the position it occupied in the morning at heavy cost, but the 62d fared better, in terms of casualties than other regiments in the brigade. The casualties for the 62d at the Wilderness included, surprisingly, no deaths, but more than fifty were wounded, captured, or missing.

The 6th of May was a long day for the 62d. At 3 a. m. the First Division moved from the right flank to the center of the Union line. It now took a position with its right resting on the Parker's Store Road. It remained waiting all day, not engaging the enemy, but being "considerably annoyed" by skirmish fire and occasional artillery shots. Finally around 7 p. m. orders came. The brigade was ordered to the rear. Then after moving back no more than 200 yards, a counter-order came to advance. After an unsuccesful attempt to drive the Confederate forces from an entrenched position, the brigade fell back again.

The 7th of May was another day of no rest. At 3 a. m., the 62d, with other regiments in the brigade, was ordered to fall back even further -- to its original position that day behind the log breastworks. Around 5:30 a. m., while still on the move, Confederates came up the road and made a charge, but were discouraged by artillery fire. The 62d Pennsylvania was then able to move into a position in the barricade created by the 22d Massachusetts several days before to the right of a heavy artillery unit already there. Once they took this position, they waited most of the day. Just after noon, they were subjected to artillery fire, but were kept waiting for further orders for the next ten hours. Finally at 11 p. m. they joined the line of march for Spottsylvania Court House.

Battle at Spottsylvania Court House, Virginia on 8 to 15 May 1864

Spottysvania Courthouse is fifteen miles southeast of the area in the Wilderness where the battle was waged. The Fifth Army Corps was ordered to make a nighttime advance by rapid march using the most direct route to seize Spottsyvania Court House. Unfortunately the march was slowed by the pitch dark, the narrowness of the road through notorious difficult terrain, Conderate barricades, and by a cavalry force blocking the way. As a result, it was daylight before they had gone more than a couple miles, and unknown to the Union generals, the Confederate force was able to move and get into position first and throw up breastworks. When the leading division of the Fifth Corps emerged from the woods at a place called Laurel Hill, about two miles northwest of Spottsylvania, it was exhausted and confused as it a Confederate force began to attack it. The line wavered and fell back. It was believed at first that the force was only a small dismounted cavalry, and a second assault was ordered. A second line of a few brigades was formed, with Sweitzer's brigade on the left. In the sharp engagement that followed, the 62d Pennsylvania Volunteers suffered heavy causalties. The Confederates had advanced their position after the first encounter. Now the Union forces drove the Confederates back to the densely wooded crest of Laurel Hill. The battlefield was no better than the Wilderness, being particularly hazardous with a heavy growth of low cedars, now mostly dead, that created a nearly impassible barrier of bayonet-like branches that were intertwined and pointed in all directions. Despite constant orders from General Meade, General Warren, now commanding the Fifth, delayed further advance until the Sixth Corps arrived. He defended his decision to his superiors reporting that the casualties had been high in deaths, wounds, and stragglers, who were too fatigued to continue. The troops would be ready, he was certain, once they had some rest, more ammunition, and necessary reinforcements. The soldiers from both sides began the task of constructing further entrenchments and breastworks.

Skirmishing continued on the 9th, and on 10 May, when a battery was moved up to the immediate left of the 62d, Confederate sharpshooters, well hidden in the woods, became even more troublesome. Further assaults were ordered, but it was reported that neither Griffin's nor another division made much of an attempt to advance.

There was little activity on the 11th, other than Grant writing his famous dispatch, proposing "to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

On 12 May, the Second and Ninth Corps were ordered to make a charge an early morning charge against what became known as the Bloody Angle. The Second Corps was initially successful, before after a day of fighting it reached a stalemate. Warren was ordered and then re-ordered to move upon the enemy at Laurel Hill "without regard to the consequences." Generals Grant and Meade believed the Confederate position at Laurel Hill must be weakened, given its strength at the Bloody Angle. Five or six assaults were quickly repulsed. Forced to order an even further assault, with the bayonet if necessary, Warren commanded his soldiers to move forward once again. With surprising vigor, given earlier reports of soldiers being discouraged, exhausted, and unwilling or unable to fight vigorously, a violent assault began. The 62d Pennsylvania, the 9th and 32d Massachusetts charged along the whole line against the enemy breastworks. The enemy position, unfortunately, was not any weaker than before, nor were the Confederates surprised. The attack proved to be a deadly, but impossible task, and they were driven back in disarray with heavy casualties. The 62d's commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel James Hull, was killed.

On the 13th, the armies rested. But that night another night manuever was ordered. Now under the command of Captain William P. Maclay of Company C, the 62d, as part of two brigades from the Fifth Corps' First Division, was moved to the left of the corps in position at the Bloody Angle, to be ready for an early morning assault. General Warren described the night march as "one to be remembered by all my Corps as one of horror among the horrible ones." The soldiers faced intense darkness, heavy rain, mud that was knee deep, through a hostile and unknown terrain. By 4 am, hardly enough soldiers to make a good skirmish line had arrived in position, and the assault was called off. On the evening of 14th, the 62d, with three other regiments, were called up to support Battery D of the Fifth Artillery. They were shelled as they went into position but suffered few casualties, finding shelter in the several ravines.

For more than a week, the armies fought from their entrenched positions, with nearly constant artillery fire, and numerous minor assaults made and repulsed. By the 16th there was a concern for rations, and considerable discomfort due to mud. Lines might have moved 500 feet one day and back another, but, except for artillery fire, there was much quiet. One day pickets might engage in fraternizing, the next in skirmishing.

Grant kept extending the line to the left in an attempt to overlap the Confederate right flank, but the Confederate position continued to be unassailable, until finally, on 20 May, the order was given for the army to move on. On the 21st Hancock's Second Corps was able to slip away from its position undetected, and the Fifth Corps soon followed.

Marching to North Anna Creek, 21 to 23 May.

Grant next planned a grand flanking effort in the Army of the Potomac's march towards Richmond. If the Army reached the North Anna Creek before the Army of Northern Virginia, it could cut off the Confederates' line of communication. On 21 May, the Fifth Corps marched south on the Telegraph Road, crossed the Mattaponi, and reached Milford for a total of ten miles. There was one brief encounter with the rebels, who were driven away. On the 22d it continued south, and on the morning of the 23d it neared the North Anna River.

Battle at North Anna River, Virginia on 23 through 25 May 1864

THE GIST: Grant had divided the army into three parts to cross the North Anna River at different fords before making an attack. Unfortunately, for Grant's plan, the Confederates had a much shorter distance to travel and had obtained information of the Union Army's movement, and was ready. The Second Corps was unable to cross because of rebel defenses. The Fifth Corps, however, crossed where it was unexpected at Jerico Ford, four miles above the rest of the Union army. Two divisions of A.P. Hill's Corps attacked the Fifth Corps after the crossing was completed, but the rebels were repulsed.

The next day Union forces at Ox Ford were repulsed at a place which became known as the hog snout, while other Union forces had more success further on the Confederate right. When Grant recognized the strength of Lee’s position, he ordered the Union Army to withdraw back across the North Anna River and move downstream, once again trying to outflank the Confederate forces while advacing on Richmond.

DETAILS ABOUT THE FIRST DIVISION, SECOND BRIGADE: I don't have details about the 62d Pennysylvania at North Anna, but the Second Brigade was heavily engaged. Fortunately for the soldiers of the Fifth Corps, when they approached the North Anna on the morning of the 23d, a local black man warned them that the Confederates were in position where they were supposed to cross. Instead they crossed the river at Jericho Ford, much farther to the west. It was not much of a crossing place, as the Second Brigade, marching at the head of column as it crossed the river, discovered when it plunged in. With waterbreast high, the current swift, and the banks high, it wasn't much of a ford, but it was unguarded. Although the Second Brigade and others continued to cross, and indeed a few soldiers were scolded for horseplay and skylarking, the main force of the Fifth Corps halted until a pontoon bridge was constructed. By 4:30 pm, the entire corps had crossed. Reforming a column, it marched over an open space about a third of a mile wide and formed a line of battle, entrenching along a fence at the edge of a woods. Skirmishers from the Second Brigade (from a regiment other than the 62d) met a few Confederate pickets. The rebels quickly retreated, but the position of the Fifth Army was now known.

Only after the completed the fortification of its position in the evening did the troops begin their evening meal preparations. They were then interrupted by a surprise attack. First they were hit by a battery barrage, then a division from A. P. Hill's Corps began its assault. Sweitzer's Brigade helped save the day. Griffin's Division was in position in the center of the line. As the division to its right fell back under the attack, the First Division held and, led by the Second, then repulsed the attack. As the Third Brigade shored up the First, the Confederate line was broken and forced to flee.

The following day, the troops of the Fifth Corps advanced their line south of the Virginia Central Railroad and further entrenched near Noel's Station, but on this and the next day, when they advanced to Little River, they saw little or no action against the Confederates. On the 26th, when Grant ordered a withdrawal, because of less fortunate developments elsewhere, the Fifth Corps recrossed the North Anna at Quarles Ford. The Battle at North Anna was over, and the next outflanking maneuver was begun.

At the battle at North Anna, 13 soldiers of the 62d Pennsylvania were wounded and one was killed.

Further Marching Through Virginia, 26 to 28 May.

Deciding that the position of the Army of the Potomac could not lead to a successful fight, Grant ordered another night march. On the night of the 26th, once again over muddy roads, the Union Army swung widely to the east and then south. By 28 May the four corps had all reached the Pamunkey River.

Engagements at Pamunkey Creek and Totopotomoy Creek, Virginia on 28, 29, 30 May 1864

The Fifth Corp started its march at 5:30 am on the 28th, and reached the Pamunkey Creek at Dabney's Ferry (near Hanovertown) four hours later. The troops crossed the creek on a pontoon bridge, continued another mile, and then constructed barricades. On the 29th, they marched three miles further before encountering rebel pickets. A line of battle was formed, but the rebels withdrew, so no encounter ensued. On the 30th, the brigade started out on the road to Shady Grove Church. The 22d Massachusetts and 4th Michigan were sent out as skirmishers. They encountered the rebels and drove them into a clearing, only to discover they had fallen into a trap. They now faced two lines of breastworks at right angles, so they were caught in a cross-fire. These regiments were able to hold on and then drive the rebels back. The 62d Pennsylvania and 32d Massachusetts then joined the line of battle to relieve them. The 62d suffered no casualties in this engagement until the morning of the 30th. Griffith's Division was ordered to drive some skirmishers from the Union front. Determined resistance intensified the combat, and Sweitzer's Brigade was ordered to advance against the Confederate line of defense. After brisk fighting, the Confederates were repulsed, but the 62d suffered heavy casualties.

Battle at Cold Harbor, Virginia, 31 May to 12 June 1864 (Bethesda Church, 3 June 1864)

THE GIST: Cold Harbor is infamous for being the bloodiest hour (or 8 minutes) of the war. Although the deadliest part of the battle lasted only briefly, the battle, from preliminary skirmishes to aftermath, was waged for several days. Fighting began as early as 31 May, when Sheridan’s cavalry seized the crossroads of Old Cold Harbor. It was not until 12 June that Grant abandoned the Overland Campaign on Richmond, and the combined Union forces marched to James River. Until the 2d of June, most of the action was manuevering, when the full strength of both armies faced each other on a front that extended several miles. On the 31st the Fifth Corps was still positioned on the Totopotomoy Creek, "pressed up against the enemy," it is recorded in Under the Maltese Cross, "as close as practical without assaulting." By the division must have manuevered right, since Griffin's Division was massed at Bethesda Church, near New Cold Harbor. This was the northernmost position of a Union line that now stretched many miles south to the Chickahominy River. Along the line, the Army of the Potomac faced a well entrenched, practically immovable force. The phrase "not war, but murder" was used to describe the action of the 3rd of June. Apparently not having learned any lesson from either Picket's Charge or the Battle of Gaines Mill fought two years earlier on nearly the same ground, Grant sent forward the Second Army Corps into another hopeless daylight charge on the 3rd of June. Beginning at dawn, the Second and Eighteenth Corps charged and were slaughtered. In the north, near Bethesda Church, additional fighting occurred, but it became immediately clear to Grant that the Overland Campaign would not lead to a successful assault on Richmond. U. S. Grant admitted later that "Cold Harbor is, I think, the only battle I ever fought that I would not fight over again under the circumstances." The Army of the Potomac then withdrew with a secrecy that fooled the Confederate generals and moved its whole force east and south, crossing the Chickahominy and the James to begin a new campaign to assault Richmond from the south.

DETAILS ABOUT THE SIXTY SECOND: Fortunately, the 62d was not part of the infamously senseless assault. The Fifth Corps was positioned near Bethesda Church on the extreme right of the line. It was not at full strength, because 10 regiments had just been ordered to the rear because their term of service had expired. As part of the Second Brigade of the First Division, the 62d was on the extreme right flank. It was so far removed from the main conflict at Cold Harbor, that the action near Bethesda Church is sometimes referred to as a separate battle. The Confederate forces, led by Jubal Ewell, either seeking to take advantage of the savagely failed Union charge earlier in the day or acting independently, tried to outflank the Federal line. The Federal troops met the attack and forced it back. On the following day, the Fifth and Ninth Corps engaged in skirmishing and assaults of the Confederate line, in part to prevent consolidation of Rebel forces to take advantage of the devastated Union line where the Second Corps had been cut down. During the next week, the 62d Pennsylvania saw no more action than occasional skirmishing.

Overland Campaign Casualties, 5 May to 3 June 1864

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This page maintained by: John R. Henderson (jhenderson@ithaca.edu), Ithaca College Library.
Last modified: 10 June 2001
Author: John R. Henderson, Ithaca College Library
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